

















































Aristotle and Bergson on Time
Manuel C. Ortiz de Landázuri 
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CHANGE DURATION MOVEMENT PERCEPTION
Both in Being and Time and Basic Problems of 
Phenomenology Heidegger criticized Bergson’s views 
on time by affirming that he misunderstood Aristotle’s 
traditional exposition from Physics IV. In this paper I 
will examine Bergson’s distinction between durée and 
the time of physics to show its relationship with 
Aristotle’s exposition. I will defend Bergson’s view on 
time by showing that it does not criticise Aristotle’s, 
as Heidegger says, but rather develops a different 
approach that goes beyond the Aristotelian paradigm. 
For this purpose, I will briefly analyze Aristotle’s texts 
of the Physics and Bergson’s views on time in his 
Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness (Essai), 
Creative Evolution (EC) and 
Duration and Simultaneity (DS). 1 It 
will be also helpful to make some 
remarks on the recently published 
courses he gave in the Collège de France.
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Both in Being and Time and Basic Problems of Phenomenology Heidegger criti-
cized Bergson’s views on time by affirming that he misunderstood Aristotle’s tra-
ditional exposition in Physics IV. He accuses Bergson of criticizing Aristotle’s vision 
of the time when in fact his philosophy of durée is dependent on it. Bergson, ac-
cording to Heidegger, would not have overcome the philosophy of presence proper 
to Aristotelian metaphysics. This dependence of Bergson on Aristotle’s philosophy of 
presence (according to Heidegger 1927a, 433) rests on the fact that Bergson’s durée 
flows in the constant present, whereas Heidegger had treated temporality as the ba-
sic condition of human existence: «Whereas durée is primarily present ‒ the eter-
nal present of the now and of the living act‒ Zeitlichkeit is primarily future. Whereas 
Bergson’s duration is first of all creation on life, Heidegger’s temporality is naked ex-
istence toward death» (Seypell 1956, 506). Now, does Bergson really criticize the 
Aristotelian conception of time, as Heidegger supposes? Did Bergson treat time in an 
Aristotlian fashion without having understood it properly? In any case, if he has done 
so, it has not been in an explicit way, since clear criticisms of Aristotle’s philosophy 
of time can hardly be found in his writings. In fact, in his best-known works about 
time (Essai, Matière et memoire, Duration et simultanéité) references to Aristotle are 
scarce, if not non-existent. In Bergson’s work, the discussion with Aristotle is absent, 
which is surprising considering the subject of his doctoral thesis: the doctrine of place 
in Aristotle (Aristoteles de loco senserit). We only find open criticism of Aristotle in 
Creative Evolution, but in this case, Bergson wants to correct the role of stable forms 
(εἰδος) in nature, the heritage of Plato’s philosophy, and not the conception of time.
Heidegger points out in Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie: i) that 
Bergson’s doctrine arises from an Aristotelian confrontation of time; ii) that Bergson’s 
interpretation of time in the common sense (vulgäre Zeitverständnis) is based on 
not having understood the Aristotelian understanding of time («beruht auf einem 
Missverständnis des Aristotelischen Zeitverständnisses» Heidegger 1927b, 328). I will 
try to show: i) that Bergson’s philosophy of time arises from a confrontation with 
the modern view of time, especially with Kant’s (time as a homogeneous scheme); 
ii) that Bergson’s interpretation of the vulgar understanding of time precisely allows 
him to inaugurate a metaphysics of flow as continuous creation, not a metaphysics 
of presence. As Massey has shown, «is explicit aim is to demonstrate that all count-
ing presupposes spatial representation and that the measurement of time treats it 
as a homogeneous medium like space. In this regard, Bergson is more directly con-
cerned with Kant’s treatment of time and space than Aristotle’s» (Massey 2005, 65). 
Heidegger, in similar fashion to Bergson, accepts that life cannot be understood from 
traditional concepts. However, he thinks that life itself has been shaped into concepts, 
such as culture, and therefore it must be understood in its cultural forms. In this sense, 
Heidegger reproaches Bergson for trying to offer a new conception of time that is ul-
timately dependent on Aristotle. In Being and Time Heidegger addresses the prob-
lem of being as presence and the Aristotelian understanding of time. The problem 
for Heidegger with the Aristotelian conception of time is that the “now”, the pres-
ent instant, has all the protagonism, due to the metaphysics of the being as presence. 
Bergson would be dependent on that conception of time that highlights the present 
instant (Heidegger 1927a, 17-18), only that he would have transferred the problem of 
time to the conscience flow. Bergson would have understood time from ontological 
categories, and would not have realized that temporali-
ty is the horizon of comprehension of Dasein. 2
The main problem of Heidegger’s views is that 
Bergson did not criticize Aristotle’s philosophy of time 
2 For H. Massey, Bergson’s depen-
dence on Aristotle is not at all 
clear, at least in the philosophy of 































































in his writings. However, it could be said that even if 
Bergson did not openly criticize Aristotle, there is an 
implicit criticism in his approach, since Aristotle under-
stands time as «number of motion in respect of “be-
fore” and “after”» (Phy. 219b1), a thesis that Bergson 
would have fought against since it would imply a spa-
tialization of time. To the extent that time is a number, 
as Aristotle says, it implies counting, measuring, and it 
would only be possible to count the movement if the 
time line has been previously spatialized and the “nows” 
have been enumerated. This would obviously mean a freezing of time and, therefore, 
time as a number would be the time of physics, different from real time, which flows. 
Aristotle, having treated time as a “measure of motion” would have considered it in a 
spatial way, and its treatment would not be valid for a real philosophy of time.
However, is this really so? Does Aristotle understand time in a spatial way? 
The important word in this problem is ἀριθμός, which is translated as “number”, but 
in a broad sense means “measure”. «It is necessary to take the act of counting as con-
sisting in noting and reproducing the structure of certain assemblies of units: a pair, a 
triad, a quarteron, a quintet, etc. The ἀριθμός is fundamentally a structure, an assem-
bly» (Brague 1982, 137).
One can only measure movement according to its structure from past 
to future, according to before and after, and with reference to other simultaneous 
movements. If this is so, time is only possible and only exists to the extent that there 
is a soul that measures, since the only thing that exists is the now that changes, that 
flows, and time is the measure that the soul makes of movement. Only the soul appre-
ciates the before and after, and the simultaneity of something with other movements.
Is this the time of physics? Yes, and as we measure motion, we spatialize 
time. This is Aristotle’s thesis, which Bergson shares completely: the time of physics is 
a measure of motion, and it implies a freezing of time to measure it according to the 
before and after compared to the “now”. However, does the time of physics exhaust 
the Aristotelian philosophy of time? In one sense it does, but in another it does not, 
for Aristotle points to an essential element of time which is not physical; the meas-
uring soul. In this respect, as will be seen later, Aristotle does not seem to think that 
time is a structure of the soul or an a priori form of sensibility, but, as Wieland points 
out (1970, 316), a necessary condition for there to be time; without the soul there is 
no point in talking about time. That is why the analysis of time in Book IV of Physics 
does not point to an “original time” of the soul, but simply analyzes what time is as it 
manifests itself in the structures of our ordinary understanding of time.
Therefore, for Aristotle, ultimately, time does not exist. What exists for 
Aristotle are the substances that change, that exist now, in action, and that have po-
tential aspects that allow change. Time is only a measure of the movement that takes 
place insofar as there is a soul that measures. In the following pages I will analyze 
briefly Aristotle’s philosophy of time in order to compare it later with Bergson’s.
II. Analysis of Time in Physics IV
 In the second part of book IV of the Physics Aristotle offers us his famous analysis of 
time. His position in this respect is that this is not something in itself, but “the num-
ber of movement according to the before and after” (Phy. 219b1). Time is number not 
in the abstract sense (which we use in counting), but in the sense of movement that 
his thesis on the place in Aristotle, 
he did not discuss it with him in 
the Essai. Massey suggests that 
Bergson’s view of time depends 
mainly on his criticism of Kant, and 
not so much on the Aristotelian 
view, as Heidegger supposes 
(Massey 2005,50 nnd 90). G. Fasolo, 
on the other hand, has tried to 
show the speculative connection 
between Bergson and Aristotle, 
































































is counted (Ross 1936, 64). However, before giving the definition of time, Aristotle 
deals with the “now”, since time seems to have to do with the “now” and its rela-
tion to the “before” and “after”. We say that time passes because the “now” is differ-
ent from what it was a while ago; before, it was in one way, after it is in another. The 
“now” only exists in a present way, so it cannot be said that time is a mere sum of 
“nows” (Phy. 218a19), since the now is changing, and time has to do with the percep-
tion of that change in the “now”, which even though it changes remains in a certain 
sense as “now”.
«In so far then as the “now” is a boundary (πέρας), it is not time, but an at-
tribute of it; in so far as it numbers, it is number (ἀριθμό‒, 220a21-22)». In which 
sense it is number? In the sense that there is time when the now is both one and two, 
both unity of the before and after and inner dimension, tension of the before and after 
(Brague 1982, 142). Time is the experience of a peculiar structure of the movement 
according to before and after. Time is ἀριθμός because is unity of two elements: be-
fore and after.
The now is not a part of time, but a limit, because time is continuous, while 
the now is like a point that changes and remains the same as a point. That is why 
Aristotle thinks that time can be compared to a line, because a line might be divid-
ed into other smaller lines, but not into points (Phy. 220a18-20). This simile is very 
important in understanding Aristotle’s purpose in book IV, to investigate the condi-
tions of possibility of time in its ordinary manifestations. If time is something contin-
uous, and we normally imagine it as a line, then it cannot be a mere sum of “nows”. 
However, the “now” is very important for the existence of time, because it enables us 
to measure movement according to the before and after, so Aristotle states:
The ‘now’ is the link of time (συνέχεια χρόνου), as has been mentioned (for it connects past 
and future time), and it is a limit of time (for it is the beginning of the one and the end of the 
other). However, this is not as obvious as it is with the point, which is fixed. It divides poten-
tially (διαιρεῖ δὲ δυνάμει), and in so far as it is dividing the ‘now’ is always different, but in 
so far as it connects it is always the same, as it is with mathematical lines (Phy. 222a10-15).
If we say that time is continuous, and not a mere sum of “nows”, it is precisely be-
cause the now is something that changes although it remains the same; something 
that flows and links the past and the future. There is only time to the extent that 
there is perception of the now. Therefore, the foundation of time seems to be in the 
perception of the instant that changes. The instant as a subject remains identical, it 
continues to be instant, even though things change. The instant taken as “essence” is 
continually changing, there is never an instant equal to another. This is precisely the 
difficulty in defining the now, in which time is not composed of “nows” as parts: «For 
we may lay it down that one “now” (τὰ νῦν) cannot be next to another, any more 
than a point to a point (στιγμὴ στιγμῆς)» (Phy. 218a18-19). Aristotle warns of the 
difficulty of dealing with the now because precisely to speak of the “now” one must 
imagine that it is a point in an imaginary time line, but that is not the now, since it is 
not a fixed point: «When we think of the extremes as different from the middle and 
the soul pronounces that the ‘nows’ are two, one before and one after, it is then that 
we say that there is time, and this that we say is time» (Phy. 219a28-30). Aristotle is 
aware that the measurement of time implies a different type of measurement from 
that of space. It is not the number as a point, but as a line delineated by points that al-
low the measurement of time. «He holds that duration is in its own nature a perfect 































































only a potential existence, are brought to actual existence by a mind which distin-
guishes periods and nows within it» (Ross 1936, 68). Precisely because time is a con-
tinuum, the now has a role in unifying time that the point does not have in unifying 
the line: «When two line segments are joined at a point, each segment itself exists as 
a unity whether or not we mark points on it. Time is not, in this way, prior to the now. 
The unity of time depends in part on our counting nows» (Coope 2005, 131).
The next step in the analysis of time is its relationship to movement. If there 
were no change, there would be no time either (Phy. 218b22), so time is dependent 
on movement. Now, why can we measure motion? Because every movement is ac-
companied by a magnitude (μέγεθος, Phy. 219a11), and it seems that time is that 
which is limited by the now (τὸ γὰρ ὁριζόμενον τῷ νῦν χρόνος εἶναι δοκεῖ καὶ ὑπο-
κείσθω, Phy. 219a30). The soul perceives time as it measures movement according to 
different “nows”, and in that sense time is limited by the “now”. In this way we can see 
how Aristotle tries to separate time from the realm of reality. Time, thinks Aristotle, 
is a construction of the soul from the perception of change, which is the real, accord-
ing to the “now” that has changed. So that «time is not movement, but only move-
ment in so far as it admits of enumeration» (ἀριθμός, Phy. 219b3).
In Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie Heidegger analyzes Aristotle’s 
treatment of time in Physics IV, trying to show that for Aristotle what is essential to 
the measurement of time is not spatialization, but making-present. On Heidegger’s 
account, measured time is not a spatialization of pure duration, but a temporaliza-
tion dominated by making-present (Massey 2005, 122). Heidegger points out that in 
order to be able to measure movement (that is time) it is necessary to be a change 
(ἔκ τινος εἴς τι), and for this appreciation the spatial character of the experience does 
not matter:
In the case of the determination of ἔκ τινος εἴς τι we should get rid ourselves completely 
of the spatial representation (räumlichen Vorstellung), something that Aristotle did, too. A 
completely formal sense of stretching out (Erstreckung) is intended in «from something to 
something». It is important to see this, because it was with reference to this determination 
that the Aristotelian concept of time was misunderstood (mißverstanden wurde) in the 
modern period, especially by Bergson; from the outset he took this dimensional character of 
time in the sense of spatial extension in its reference to motion. 
(Heidegger 1927b: 343-344) 3
Now, one thing is that in order to understand time we 
have to ignore the space in which the movement takes place, and another thing is that 
in order to count time the mind does not “spatialize” it, placing one moment next to 
another in succession. These are two different levels and, in fact, Bergson will under-
line the second level as the key to avoiding many errors in philosophy. One thing is the 
space in which the movement takes place (which must be ignored), and another is the 
succession in which the mind places the events according to the before and after.
A different question is whether Aristotle spatializes time (in a Bergsonian 
way) in his doctrine. In a certain sense he does (by stressing the character of time 
as measure), and in a certain sense he does not (by linking time as a measure with 
movement as change): ὁ χρόνος ἀκολουθεῖ τῇ κινήσει (Phy. 219b23). Heidegger un-
derstands this ἀκολουθεῖ in an existential way regarding motion thought along with 
time, rather than regarding time as being derived from motion (Massey 2005, 163).
































































III. Time and the Soul
According to Aristotle, time as such does not exist, there is only movement and the 
soul that measures it. Now, what exactly is the relationship between the soul and 
time that Aristotle marks? Could there be time without a soul? Aristotle makes it 
clear that this is not possible, but then, is time a form of the soul, as an a priori scheme 
of sensibility? Does Aristotle point to an idealistic theory of time (Hamelin 1931, 42)? 
And, if this is not so, perhaps he does not give a glimpse of an “original time”, proper to 
the soul, prior to movement, and with which the soul measures movement? This last 
hypothesis would seem to put Aristotle precisely in relation with Bergson, since apart 
from the time of the physics we could speak of an internal time, proper to the soul or 
the conscience. However, it should be considered that if Aristotle had pointed to an 
“original time” or “soul time”, this would not be what Bergson calls the real durée. It 
is not because the durée is not the “original time” as Heidegger thinks, it is not only a 
“time of consciousness”, nor even a “time of the human being”, but is the very time of 
things that flow, and that encompasses both human life and the life of the universe.
However, firstly it is necessary to examine Aristotle’s position regarding 
the soul and time: «But if nothing but soul, or in soul reason (ψυχῆς νοῦς), is qualified 
to count, it is impossible for there to be time unless there is soul» (Phy. 223a25-27). 
There is time in as much as the soul can number. Aristotle says little more about how 
the soul may be able to number with respect to “before” and “after”. It should be ad-
mitted that the soul “remains” in respect to change in a certain sense and can num-
ber it, because without something that does not change in respecto to change, there 
could be no perception of change. It cannot be attributed to Aristotle that time is a 
“scheme” of sensibility or that there is an “original time” of consciousness. In any case 
it can be admitted that the human soul has the capacity to look (θεωρεῖν) beyond 
change and live life beyond the immediate present, thanks to memory and fantasy. 
Even though animals have these faculties, they are not capable of measuring time be-
cause they do not consider the now as “now”. In this sense, Wieland’s position (1970, 
316) seems to be correct: time for Aristotle does not occur through the soul (durch 
der Seele) or in the soul (in der Seele), but rather depends on the activity of the soul 
(nicht ohne der Tätigkeit der Seele). Wieland considers that in the analysis of time 
Aristotle makes a consideration of the predicative structures already present in ordi-
nary language about time and its properties. In this sense, the presupposition of the 
soul is not a fact of daily experience, but, is the result of a reflection on the conditions 
of possibility of such an experience (Conill 1981, 257). Time as measure or number 
depends on the act of the soul that measures (Festugière 1971, 206).
Aristotle does not therefore present an idealistic philosophy of time, but 
simply makes time dependent on two poles: the soul that measures and the move-
ment that is measured. Aristotle thus puts an objective and a real criterion on the per-
ception of time (Dubois 1961, 299-300), which is the very movement of things. Roark 
has recently defended an hylomorphic understanding of Aristotle’s doctrine on time, 
in which motion is the matter of time, and perception its form (Roark 2011): the only 
problem of this interpretation is that it could lead to an idealistic view of time (time 
as the form of perception). Ross seems to propose a realistic thesis on time as a real 
element of change (movement):
Time is not the ratio cognoscendi of change. It is rather the ratio essendi. A thing can only 
be in one place, or in one state, at once; it is the existence of time that makes it possible for a 































































already involves time as an element) the existence of the same thing in different places or 
states, becomes the ratio cognoscendi of time. (Ross 1936, 65)
According to Ross, it seems that one thing is “real time” and another thing “know 
time”. If this is so, Aristotle would have seen the duration of things in a way very close 
to Bergson’s approach. However, there is a lack of textual evidence for this interpre-
tation. I will compare both views after examining Bergson’s treatment of time.
IV.  Bergson on Aristotle
Did Bergson criticize Aristotle’s analysis of time? We would strive in vain to find a cri-
tique of the approach of Physics IV in the works of the French philosopher. Either 
Bergson finds no reason to criticize it, or he is more interested in focusing his crit-
icism on contemporary approaches (Kant, psychological positivism, etc.). It is clear 
that Bergson could not ignore Aristotle, as his doctoral dissertation was about the 
question of place in the Physics. Therefore, if Bergson does not confront Aristotle, it 
is because deep down he either accepts his approaches or finds no reason to criticize 
them. As I will demonstrate, an examination of Bergson’s approach allows us to un-
derstand to what extent Aristotle was the philosopher who best described how the 
idea of time originates, that is, the time of physics, the time we use in our daily lives, 
as a measure of movement. Aristotle himself is clear in his treatise when he states 
that time has magnitude because movement is susceptible to measurement (Phy. 
219a11). Without movement there would be no time, and it is the soul that makes that 
measurement. Because time is a measure we necessarily spatialize it and draw it as a 
line (Phy. 220a17). In summary, Bergson could accept without reservation Aristotle’s 
treatment of time, the time of physics is the measure of movement; that time is not 
real, the only real thing is the very movement of things. Now, Bergson intends to intro-
duce a time even “more real” than that of physics, to go into the very heart of reality, of 
movement; real duration as a march in continuous creation (DS: 53).
However, one remaining question of time in Aristotle could still be analyzed 
through Bergson’s lens, did Aristotle spatialize time? Here the answer is less clear. On 
the one hand it seems he did, because by considering time as a measure of movement, 
Aristotle emphasizes the fact of measuring time, and that measurement is only pos-
sible insofar as the movement has magnitude. On the other hand, it seems he did not 
spatialize it because Aristotle himself is aware that time cannot be taken as a sum of 
instants; the now cannot be understood as a point in a line, since it is something con-
tinuous that flows. Now, when we measure time, we have to take the now as a limit 
in a segment of time: this is necessarily an exercise of intelligence in which we “spa-
tialize” time and turn it into a line. That is why, in the end, Aristotle spatializes time, 
although he is aware that this is a different measuring exercise from the real “now”, 
which is something continuous that flows, is in constant flux.
V. Time in Bergson
Time certainly occupies a major place in Bergson’s philosophy; however, while Bergson 
does not have a specific writing on time, this theme appears again and again in his 
various writings. Therefore, when analyzing time in Bergson, it is important not to 
lose sight of the intention with which it appears in a work that deals with other top-
ics. For example, the purpose in the Essai is to show how philosophers and psycholo-































































continuous flow of the life of consciousness. Now, from this it would be inappropriate 
to think that Bergson understands time only as the flow of consciousness or an “inner 
time” to the subject. Moreover, the main objective of the Essai is to show the limits 
of the spatialization of psychological phenomena and to safeguard human freedom 
against determinism (Essai, VII-VIII), however, the question of time remains quite 
open. It is true that already in the Essai Bergson places the pure duration in front of 
the operation of the mind that places the images in space, but Bergson does not at-
tempt to develop a philosophy of time in all its amplitude. In this sense, it is possible to 
consider Bergsonism as a philosophy that starts with psychology but continues with 
cosmology and ends with theology (Gouhier 1948, 161). Rather, what Bergson tries 
to do is to show the limitation of spatializing the living time of consciousness: «Can 
time be adequately represented by space? To this we must answer: yes, if we are talk-
ing about passed time; no, if we are talking about the 
time that flows» (Essai, 166). 4
The key to the entire doctrine of time in the 
Essai is that time can only be understood in terms of 
space insofar as time has already passed and we need 
to measure it. The time that passes, the time that is 
lived in the now is something different that is not possi-
ble to spatialize. To talk about that living time, Bergson uses the word durée:
What is time inside us? A qualitative multiplicity, without resemblance to the number; an or-
ganic development that is not, however, an increasing quantity [...]. What is there of duration 
outside of us? Only the present, or, if one prefers, simultaneity. Without doubt external things 
change, but their moments follow one another only for a con-
sciousness that remembers them. (Essai, 170) 5
However, in the Essai duration is very much related to 
the flow of consciousness, to the extent that it seems 
that time would be that same flow. In this way, there 
is no “data” of consciousness as such, but a flow, a du-
ration, which when it comes back on itself, “spatializes” 
time. In this work there is no treatment of the durée 
with metaphysical value, since the point of view of 
study is psychological.
In Matter and Memory, Bergson does not deal 
directly with the subject of time and duration, he only mentions the duration of con-
sciousness as opposed to the time of physics. The objective of this treatise, as the au-
thor indicates at the beginning, is the relationship of the body with the spirit, and that 
is why the question of time occupies a secondary place. It is undoubtedly in Creative 
Evolution and in Duration and Simultaneity that Bergson develops his philosophy of 
time in a genuine way, giving metaphysical value to the internal time of things, as we 
will see later on.
VI. Abstract and Real Time
Through the different writings of La pensée et le mouvant we find the idea that the 
problem of time lies in the confusion of taking the abstract time of physics, the time 
that we elaborate as a measure of movement, as if it were real time. In this sense, 
when Aristotle states that time is a measure of motion, and that it does not exist in 
4 «Le temps peut-il se répresenter 
adéquatement par de l’espace? A 
quoi nos répondons: oui, s’il s’agit 
du tems écoulé; non, si vous par-
lez du temps qui s’écoule». I use 
my own translation for the texts of 
Bergson.
5 «Qu’est-ce que la durée 
au-dedans de nous? Une multi-
plicité qualitative, sans ressem-
blance avec le nombre; un dével-
oppement organique qui n’est 
pourtant pas une quantité crois-
sante […]. Qu’existe-t-il, de la 
durée, en dehors de nous? Le 
présent seulement, ou, si l’on 
aime mieux, la simultanéité. Sans 
doute les choses extérieures 
changent, mais leurs moments ne 
se succèdent que pour une con-































































itself (since what exists is the motion that is measured), he does not present a the-
sis that Bergson rejects, but rather the reverse. The time of which Aristotle speaks is 
not something that exists, it is only a construction of the mind, a useful abstraction:
What exactly is the present? If it is a question of the present instant, I mean a mathematical 
instant which is to time what the mathematical point is to the line, it is clear that such an 
instant is a pure abstraction, a view of the mind; it can not have real existence. ...] Our con-
sciousness tells us that, when we speak of our present, it is at a certain interval of time that 
we think. How long? Impossible to fix exactly; it is something 
quite floating. (2013, 168-169) 6
To take the present as a mathematical instant is a 
pure abstraction, something that Aristotle had already 
warned of when he rejected the possibility of speak-
ing of the “now” as a point in a line (Phy. 218a18). In 
any case, Aristotle thought that if we take the now as a 
measure, we must have it as the limit of a segment, so 
that the “before” and “after” are the terms of a time line. 
However, also in this case Bergson could say that it is 
an abstraction that has spatialized time turning it into 
a line: “The line we are measuring is motionless, time 
is mobility. The line is made at all, time is what is being made, and even what makes 
everything being made. The measurement of time is 
never about duration as duration” (2013, 3). 7
Bergson thinks that real time has to do with 
the intrinsic character of the movement as “becoming”. 
We could only say that there is no time if everything 
was already done and nothing changed’ if the universe 
were a whole composed of always the same move-
ments, as Aristotle thought. However, the universe, the world, life, is always differ-
ent. This is why we must admit that there is a real duration that operates in things. In 
other words, the “before” and “after” are not mere mental constructions, but rather 
operate in reality.
VII. Reality of Duration
 The real duration of things is not for Bergson a metaphysical hypothesis, but some-
thing found purely and simply in immediate experience. The foundation of Bergson’s 
philosophy on time must be sought in our own experience, without abstractions such 
as “data”, “sensitive impression”, etc., which are constructions of the intelligence. In 
this way: “Real duration is proved; we see that time is passing, and on the other hand 
we cannot measure it without converting into space and assuming that everything 
we know has passed” (DS, 62). 8 Real duration is not de-
duced from the experience of time, it is not an “original 
time” of consciousness. Bergson never makes a “tran-
scendental deduction” of the original time, nor does he 
demonstrate the existence of the durée through ar-
gument, because it is the experience itself that direct-
ly shows the real duration, without the need for deduc-
tions. This time, on the other hand, is not only a psychic time, but real, ontological time:
6 «Qu’est-ce au juste que le pré-
sent ? S’il s’agit de l’instant actuel, 
– je veux dire d’un instant mathé-
matique qui serait au temps ce 
que le point mathématique est à 
la ligne, – il est clair qu’un pareil 
instant est une pure abstrac-
tion, une vue de l’esprit ; il ne sau-
rait avoir d’existence réelle. […] 
Notre conscience nous dit que, 
lorsque nous parlons de notre pré-
sent, c’est à un certain intervalle 
de durée que nos pensons. Quelle 
durée ? Impossible de fixer exacte-
ment ; c’est quelque chose assez 
flottant»
7 «La ligne qu’on mesure est immo-
bile, le temps est mobilité. La ligne 
est du tout fait, le temps est ce qui 
se fait, et même ce qui fait que tout 
se fait. Jamais la mesure du temps 
ne porte sur la durée en tant que 
durée»
8 «La durée réelle est éprou-
vée; nous constatons que le 
temps se déroule, et d’autre par-
tie nous ne pouvons pas le mesu-
rer sans convertir en espace et sup-
































































If time has a positive reality, if the delay of duration over instantaneity represents a certain 
hesitation or indeterminacy inherent to a certain part of things that holds everything else sus-
pended, and if there is creative evolution, I understand very well that the already developed 
part of time appears as a juxtaposition in space and no longer 
as a pure succession. (DS, 63) 9
Time is real as duration because things are not made, but 
are being made, incorporating reality into novelties. That 
is why reality is creative evolution. Philosophers have 
treated time as a homogeneous whole, as if things were 
there and time “passed” over them. However, Bergson’s 
point is that time as duration operates in the very flow 
of things. Time is that constantly new flow. What is ex-
perienced now is always new with respect to the past. 
Bergson says: «All our belief in objects, all our operations on the systems that science 
isolates, are in fact base on the idea that time does not bite on them» (EC, 8) and he 
also states: «The universe lasts. The more we go deeper into the nature of time, the 
more we understand that duration means inventions, the creation of forms, the con-
tinuous elaboration of the absolutely new» (EC, 11). 10 11
At this point it becomes clear that Bergson 
makes a distinction between time as a construction 
in a scientific (that of physics) or vulgar sense (the 
time we use in our daily lives to solve practical prob-
lems), and time as the actual duration of things. In 
this sense, for Bergson, the Aristotelian analysis would 
not be incorrect; indeed, it would have seemed perfect 
in explaining how we construct time from the meas-
ure of movement. However, this analysis would have 
been insufficient, since it would not have taken into ac-
count that duration operates on things themselves. Aristotle thought that the uni-
verse moved in homogeneous cosmic cycles. Time does not change things, but things 
change in an unchanging time. Bergson tries to show how time has its foundation in 
the very movement of things which is based on a real duration, which makes things 
always different.
VIII. Duration, “Originary” Time and Time of Physics
Now it is possible to establish three types of time in Bergson’s philosophy. On the one 
hand, the real time of things, what Bergson calls durée and which is presented as a 
flow in constant novelty. On the other hand, the direct experience of this durée which 
is captured by intuition, and which is the original experience of time in consciousness. 
Finally, time as a conceptual construction from the original experience of time, which 
leads to the spatialised time of physics.
This distinction between durée, experience of durée and time in physics is 
fundamental both to understand why Bergson does not psychologize time (since it 
has a real foundation, the flow of reality itself), and to understand Bergson’s critique 
of Einstein’s theory of relativity, at least with regard to some of its philosophical im-
plications (Bergson reproaches Einstein for having turned time into a dimension, con-
ceptualizing time in a new way).
It is in our experience of the continuous duration of things that we 
9 «Si le temps a une réalité posi-
tive, si le retard de la durée sur 
l’instantanéité représente une ser-
taine hésitation ou indétermina-
tion inherente à une certaine par-
tie des choses qui tient suspendue 
à elle tout le reste, enfin s’il y a évo-
lution créatrice, je comprends très 
bien que la partie déjà déroulée du 
temps apparaise comme juxtapo-
sition dans l’espace et non plus 
comme succession pure»
10 «Tout notre croyance aux objets, 
toutes nos opérations sur les 
systèmes que la science isole, 
reposent en effet sur l’idée que le 
temps ne mord pas sur eux»
 
11 «L’univers dure. Plus nous 
approfondirons la nature du temps, 
plus nous comprendrons que durée 
signifie inventions, création de 
































































encounter real time, multiplicity without divisibility and succession without separa-
tion. As Ĉapek (1971, 118-125) stated in contrast to the criticisms of Ushenko (1929, 
120-121) and Lovejoy (1913, 328-329), the indivisible continuity of duration does not 
imply the absence of distinctions between the phases of duration. Bergson stresses 
that in real duration the separation of different qualities is not possible, but those dif-
ferent qualities do exist (Mourelos 1964, 88). The fact that they cannot be separated 
(because making such a separation is a conceptual operation) is not the same as say-
ing that there are no distinct qualities.
IX. Simultaneity and Duration of the Universe
An important question when talking about the durée is in what sense various dura-
tions coexist in the universe and whether it is possible to speak of a single duration, 
common to all the other durations. The course that Bergson gave at the Collège de 
France in the 1901-1902 academic year, centred on the idea of time, and there are 
some enlightening expositions of what he thinks about the durée:
Duration is presented to us naturally, immediately as a moving continuity of qualities that 
extend each other. We said that there is not one duration, but rather durations, more or less 
tense, which represent, corresponding to all conceivable degrees of tension, from the com-
plete relaxation, which would be the lowest degree of materiality, to the highest tension, to 
the duration contracted in itself, in its entirety, it would be eter-
nity. (Lesson 16th May 1902) 12
Bergson already treats the durée here as a metaphys-
ical, ontological flow, so that there are no “beings”, but 
“durations”, and here the duration appears as a unitary 
flow that can have more or less “tension”. The material-
ity of things is nothing but a relaxed duration, without 
any tension, in which something remains unchanged, 
whereas eternity would be the total duration, the per-
fect flow. Now, Bergson speaks here of the different du-
ration of each thing, so that there is not one duration, 
but multiple ones. This idea is corrected (or at least nu-
anced) in DS by stating a single duration of the universe (DS, 44). The confrontation 
with Einstein’s theory of relativity leads Bergson to think that a single duration of the 
universe is necessary as a reference for all other durations in order to admit simulta-
neity. As Deleuze points out (1968, 87), if there is multiplicity in time it is necessarily 
by reference to a unit, since the multiple is only possible by reference to the one.
X. Duration and Originary Time
In his analysis of time in Bergson and Heidegger, Tugendhat states that for both think-
ers there is a subjective time that is more original than natural time in its structure 
(Tugendhat 1992, 573-584). Certainly, it seems that Bergson treats durée as the time 
of consciousness and, in this sense, as either an original time or deeper and more real 
than “ordinary” time or the time of physics. However, is the durée only the time of 
consciousness? No, it is rather the time of life and, as such, it is not strictly subjective, 
but “internal” to things. It is not subjective because one can have an objective expe-
rience of that time or internal duration of things. The evident proof is that duration 
12 «La durée nous est présentée 
naturallement, immédiatement 
comme une continuité mobile de 
qualités qui se prolongent les unes 
les autres. Nous disions qu’il n’y 
a pas une durée, mais des durées, 
plus au moins tendues, qui repré-
sentent, qui correspondent à tous 
les degrés concevables de tension, 
depuis le relâchement complet, qui 
serait le plus bas degré de la maté-
rialité, jusqu’à la tension la plus 
haute, jusqu’à la durée contrac-
































































operates in a real way: things flow irreversibly, and time operates in the same flow. 
Bergson says in DS:
The thing and the state are but instants artificially taken on the transition; and this transition, 
only naturally experienced, is the duration itself. It is memory, but not personal memory ex-
ternal to what it retains, distinct from a past which it would ensure the preservation of; it is a 
memory internal to the change itself, a memory which prolongs the before in the after and pre-
vents them from being pure instants appearing and disappear-
ing in a present which is constantly being reborn. (DS, 41) 13
Memory, the original duration, is not a «time of con-
sciousness», as Tugendhat and possibly Heidegger sup-
pose, but the very time of flowing reality. Tugendhat in 
his analysis seems not to have understood Bergson’s 
position well, since he takes the durée as the “original 
consciousness of time”; that is, according to Tugendhat, 
Bergson would have distinguished the homogeneous, 
spatialized time, which is a mental construction, and 
a previous original time of consciousness. The prob-
lem with this interpretation is that this original time for 
Bergson goes beyond consciousness, it is the duration of life itself. Only from this per-
spective can we understand Bergson’s commitment to the creative evolution in order 
to explain how time operates in the flow of life.
XI. Conclusions
Bergson knew Aristotle’s philosophy of time well, and not only did he write his doc-
toral thesis on its place in Book IV of Physics, but also in his courses at the Collège de 
France from 1902-1903 he exposed Aristotle’s philosophy of time in contrast to Plato 
and Plotinus (Bergson 2016, 151-167). Curiously, we do not find there a criticism of 
the idea of time in Aristotle, but rather a defence against the Kantian interpretation, 
in a realistic sense. Bergson says that Aristotle does not believe that there would be no 
time if there were no human soul, since the soul of heaven that contains everything 
and possesses a regular movement would be the measure of all movements:
This sentence: suppress the soul, there is no more time, this sentence will simply mean that 
if there is movement of the sky, the sky enveloping all things and the sky moving with a reg-
ular movement, if there is sky, as it is not possible to do otherwise than to exist with it the 
soul enveloped by it, time will be born from an action and a reaction, from the movement on 
the soul and from the soul on the movement. Time will there-
fore be an absolutely necessary thing. (Bergson 2016, 162) 14
However, Bergson thinks that Aristotle is obscure on 
this point and does not finish explaining what it means 
that heaven has a soul. Now, to think that the universe 
has a “soul” might lead one to think that time is some-
thing internal to things themselves. This is a question 
that neither Aristotle in the Physics nor Bergson in his 
exposition of Aristotle addresses. Now, if Aristotle had 
assumed that time has its foundation in the soul and 
13 «La chose et l’etat ne sont que 
des instantanés artificielement 
pris sur la transition; et cette tran-
sition, seuel naturellement expéri-
mentée, est la durée même. Elle est 
mémoire, mais non pas mémoire 
personelle extérieure à ce qu’elle 
retient, disctincte d’un passé 
dont elle assurerait la conserva-
tion; c’est une mémoire intériure 
au changement lui-même, mémoire 
qui prolongue l’avant dans l’après 
et les empêche d’être de purs ins-
tantanés apparaisant et disparais-
sant dans un présent qui renaîtrat 
sans cesse»
14 «Cette phrase: supprimez l’âme, 
il n’y a plus de temps, cette phrase 
signifiera simplement ceci que si 
on se donne le mouvement du ciel, 
le ciel enveloppant toutes choses 
et le ciel se mouvant d’un mou-
vement régulier, si on se donne le 
ciel, comme on ne peut pas faire 
autrement que de se donner avec 
lui l’âme enveloppé par lui, le temps 
naîtra d’une action et d’une reac-
tion, du mouvement sur l’âme et de 
l’âme sur le mouvement. Le temps 
































































that the universe has a numerical soul, we would be facing a thesis close to the real 
duration of the universe in the Bergsonian sense. However, this hypothesis is only a 
remote connection, although Aristotle points in some instances to an objective dura-
tion of the universe:
If, then, what is first is the measure (πρῶτον μέτρον) of everything homogeneous with it, 
regular circular motion is above all else the measure, because the number of this is the best 
known. Now neither alteration nor increase nor coming into being can be regular, but loco-
motion can be. This also is why time is thought to be the movement of the sphere, because 
the other movements are measured by this, and time by this movement (Phy. 223b17-24).
Aristotle thinks that there is a stable movement or rhythm that serves as a measure 
for time. «The only kind of movement which naturally maintains a uniform pace is 
movement in a circle; and the rotation of the heavenly sphere therefore furnishes the 
best unit for measuring the movement of everything else» (Ross 1936, 66). Now, if 
this is so, did Aristotle not point to the idea that beyond time as an act of measure-
ment there is a rhythm to the motion of the universe, and that therefore, it would be 
a “real duration” of the motion? It seems so, and it is what Ross points out when he 
stresses that time is the ratio essendi of change (Ross 1936, 65). But it should be not-
ed that time is then a certain circle (κύκλος τις, 233b29), and here lies the main dif-
ference with Bergson’s approach. Real duration thinks Bergson, is above all novelty, is 
continuous creation, and never mere repetition.
Going back to the analysis of time, Bergson’s turning point with respect to 
Aristotle would be that for Aristotle time would not exist without the numerical ca-
pacity of the soul, because there will be only movement, which is the “substratum” of 
time. In this way, time adds nothing to movement, there could be movement without 
time. For Bergson, however, movement implies internal time, duration. Something 
changes in the time arrow that transforms reality in an irreversible mode: there could 
be movement without time built by the soul, but there cannot be movement with-
out internal duration, without irreversible flow towards something new and different.
For Bergson, time is not only a measure of the movement, but something 
else, because “before” and “after” are not simple moments; they point to the fluctu-
ating arrow of the very movement of things. Time is thus the ontological property of 
being, which is movement, change. Time operates in the very heart of things in such 
a way that, contrary to what Newton and Kant had understood, it is not homogene-
ous, but always different; reality does not “pass” through time, but reality exists in a 
flow from past to future, is always new.
In this sense, Bergson could admit Aristotle’s analysis of time as valid as 
long as it is taken into account that it is “measured” time, “already past” time, since 
time of real duration cannot be measured:
The time that lasts is not measurable. The measure which is not purely conventional implies 
in effect division and superposition. However, successive durations cannot be superimposed 
to check whether they are equal or unequal. (DS, 47) 15
Bergson had already observed this in the Essai. To be 
able to measure something, it is necessary to group 
things into homogeneous units, identical from a certain 
point of view (Essai, 57). However, it is impossible to 
have two homogeneous durations, since the duration is 
15 «Le temps qui dure n’est pas 
mesurable. The measure which is 
not purely conventional implies in 
effect division and superposition. 
Or on ne saurait superposer des 
durées succesives pour vérifier si 































































always different. From this point of view, when Aristotle says that time is the meas-
ure of the movement according to the before and the after, what he has done is to 
homogenize the instants of time as segments that delineate a line. It is only possible 
to count according to before and after if I convert time lived to a succession of homo-
geneous instants.
One could still ask whether Bergson, although he did not openly criticize 
Aristotle’s conception of time, would have misunderstood it by criticizing a concep-
tion of time that would be basically dependent on that of Aristotle. Would Bergson 
have misunderstood the Aristotelian conception of time and, if he had understood it 
correctly, would not have developed the philosophy of durée?
I think that Bergson would not need to criticize Aristotle too much on this 
point, although Aristotle could have deepened in the foundation of time: change (ἀκο-
λουθεῖ τῇ κινήσει, Phy. 219b23). It is the primary duration of things and our expe-
rience of it that is the foundation of time. Actually Aristotle is very close to under-
standing time as a continuum. Bergson’s understanding of durée is close to Aristotle’s 
philosophy of the “now”. The “now” (τὸ νῦν) is always new, different, and at the same 
time continuous. It is the very flow of movement (τὸ δὲ νῦν διὰ τὸ κινεῖσθαι τὸ φε-
ρόμενον αἰει ἕτερον, Phy. 220a14), as Heidegger point out: «The now is consequently 
not a part of time but is always time itself» (Das Jetzt ist daher kein Teil der Zeit, son-
dern ist immer die Zeit selbst, Heidegger 1927b, 354). In the experience of the “now” is 
revealed the inner duration of things. Lévinas was certainly right when he denounced 
the summary execution of Bergson in Being and Time (Sinclair 2019, §11) because, in 
fact, it is through a peculiar reading of Aristotle that he can say that Bergson fail to 
overcome the Aristotelian paradigm (Massey 2005, 122).
For Bergson, time as a measurement is the objective measure of the move-
ment, the constructed time that exists only for the soul it measures. Real time, how-
ever, is the flow of the universe, the continuous γήνησις of the cosmos. Bergson does 
not criticize the Aristotelian analysis of time, but rather accepts it as a valid analy-
sis for the time of science, even for time as a measure of movement in our daily lives. 
Now, the appreciation that time is based on movement, as Aristotle had said, leads 
Bergson to situate time in the very heart of the flow of things. Thus, what Bergson 
could criticize Aristotle is his failure to realize that reality in motion is not a universe 
without history or duration. Aristotle thought that substances were there and moved 
in an unchanging universe, without internal time. Bergson’s intuition is that time op-
erates in nature creating novelty. The universe lasts, Bergson thinks in EC and DS, and 
involves the continuous creation of novelty. In this sense, the universe and things that 
change can be understood as an open potentiality, constant genesis (Mourelos 1964, 
93), what Bergson calls “virtuality”, as something that is not current but has a reality 
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